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CASE NOTES
not know of any membership choice when they joined the union. Since it is
likely, however, that litigation would eventually establish minimum stan-
dards for unions to meet in carrying the burden of proving that members
knew or should have known of their membership choice, the group not sub-
ject to court-enforced fines because they were ill-informed would eventually
disappear while all union members would be informed of their legal rights
under a union-shop provision. It is also likely that the threat of social
ostracism and the potential advantages of participation in union programs,
including voting on union policy, would keep those who chose to pay only
dues at a minimum. These nominal members would not be "free riders" nor
would they be restrained or coerced into joining the concerted activities
of the group in whose internal affairs they wished to take no part. 4°
ROBERT S. BLOOM
Labor. Law—Labor Management Relations Act—Section 301(a)—State
Court Injunction Against Strike—Removal to Federal Court.—Avco
Corp. v. Machinists Aero Lodge 73 5.1—Plaintiff corporation, which is
engaged in interstate commerce, had entered into a collective-bargaining
agreement with defendant union. The agreement included both a no-strike
clause and a binding-arbitration clause. Following a series of work stoppages
which culminated in a plantwide strike, the corporation brought suit against
the union in a state court, requesting both an injunction against the strike
and "general relief." When the state court issued a temporary restraining
order against violation of the no-strike clause, the union, pursuant to Section
1441(b) of the Removal Act, 2 removed the action to the federal district
court, and there moved: (1) to dissolve the temporary injunction; and (2)
to dismiss the action on the ground that the district court has no power to
issue or maintain the injunction by reason of the restrictions of Section 4
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act .a The corporation moved to remand the action
43 In the union answer to the rehearing petition of Allis-Chalmers at the court of
appeals level, the union conceded that if the fined members had no obligation to the
union beyond paying dues and fees they would not be subject to the union "'require-
ment of obedience to the common cause.'" 358 F.2d at 669.
1 376 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 88 S. Ct. 103 (1967) (No. 445).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1965).
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of
the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or resi-
dence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of
the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of
the State in which such action is brought.
3 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1965).
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing
out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or
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to the state court on the alternate grounds that: (1) its cause of action was
based solely on state law; and (2) even if the cause of action arose under
federal law, Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, by its terms, prevents
removal of the action to a district court. The district court dissolved the
temporary injunction, 4
 but refused to dismiss the action or remand the case
to the state court.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the de-
cision of the district court. HELD: An action brought in a state court to
enjoin a breach of a no-strike provision in a collective-bargaining agreement
in an industry affecting interstate commerce is removable to a federal district
court.
The Sixth Circuit considered two separate issues in this case: (1 )
whether the plaintiff's cause of action arises under the laws of the United
States; and (2) if it does, whether Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, by
its terms, prevents removal of the action to a federal district court. In allow-
ing removal, the Sixth Circuit specifically rejected the holding of the Third
Circuit on both of these issues in American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Int'l
Union of Operating Eng'rs. 5 That case involved substantially the same fact
pattern as the case under discussion. The Third Circuit held that a claim
seeking to enjoin the breach of a no-strike clause, if on its face based solely
on state law, does not arise under federal law° and that section 4 withdraws
from federal courts the original jurisdiction necessary for removal under
Section 1441(b) of the Removal Act. 7
The plaintiff's cause of action certainly arises under the laws of the
United States if it falls within the scope of Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley
Act, 8 which provides in part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
The Supreme Court has pronounced on the scope of section 301 in
interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing,
whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation
of employment.. .
4 "All injunctions, orders, and other proceedings had in such action prior to its
removal shall remain in full force and effect until dissolved or modified by the district
court." 28 U.S.C. § 1450 (1965).
5 338 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1964) (2-1 decision), 'cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965),
noted in 6 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 957 (1965). See Spelfogel, Enforcement of No-
Strike Clause by Injunction, Damage Actions and Discipline, 7 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev.
239, 248-50 (1966).
6 338 F.2d at 846.
7 Id. at 840-42.
8 29 U.S.C. 	 185(a) (1965).
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Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co.," interpreting a collective-bargaining
agreement providing for compulsory arbitration. The state court had held
that the case could be decided exclusively on state contract law." Although
the Supreme Court affirmed the result obtained under state law, it rejected
the state court's holding that the case could be decided within the limited
horizon of state law, and held that "suits of a kind covered by section 301"
require the application of federal substantive law." The Supreme Court's
decision in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills 12 likewise rejects the view that
state contract law may serve as an independent source of rights to enforce
collective-bargaining agreements in industries affecting interstate commerce.
This case concerned the breach of a compulsory-arbitration clause in a no-
strike collective-bargaining contract. The Court held that section 301 autho-
rizes the federal courts to fashion a body of federal contract law for the
construction and enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements. 13 The
Court ruled that although state law may be resorted to in order to find the
best rule to effectuate a federal labor policy, any state laws applied "will be
absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent source of private
rights."" Avco did involve alleged breach of a collective-bargaining contract
in an industry affecting interstate commerce; it follows, therefore, that the
Sixth Circuit was correct in deciding that the corporation's cause of action
arose under federal law.
The right to removal was squarely presented as the second issue. Section
1441(b) of the Removal Act authorizes removal of an action over which the
district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising
under the laws of the United States. 15 This has been construed to mean that
an action is removable to a district court if the action could have been
originally brought in the district court." Therefore, the issue of removability
in Avco depends on whether plaintiff corporation could have originally
brought its action in the district court. But since the corporation's cause of
action included a prayer for injunctive relief against a peaceful strike, 17 the
Avco case was properly removed only if a district court has jurisdiction of
an action in which an injunction against a peaceful strike is among the
remedies sought. In answering this question it is necessary to consider the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, focusing on its prohibition against the issuance by a
federal court of certain types of labor injunctions.
Section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia denies federal courts "jurisdiction to
9 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
10 Lucas. Flour Co. v. Teamsters Local 174, 57 Wash. 2d 95, 102, 356 P.2d 1, 5
(1961).
11 369 U.S. at 103.
12 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
13 Id. at 451, 456.
11 Id. at 457.
15 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1965).
16 TVA v. Tennessee Elec. Power Co., 90 F.2d 885, 888 (6th Cir. 1937), cert. denied,
301 U.S. 710 (1938); see also Minnesota v. Northern Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48, 63-64 (1904).
17 Plaintiff's brief seems to allege no activities which would take the strike out of
the purview of Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See Brief for Plaintiff at 1-3,
376 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1967).
233
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
issue" injunctions against peaceful strikes." Although Section 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act confers jurisdiction upon the district courts to enforce
collective-bargaining contracts," the Supreme Court has held that this grant
of jurisdiction does not impliedly repeal the prohibitions of section 42°
Therefore, federal courts remain without jurisdicton to grant injunctions
against peaceful strikes."' However, the question in Avco is not whether
federal courts have jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief, but whether they
have jurisdiction of an action in which injunctive relief against a peaceful
strike is among the remedies requested. The Supreme Court seems to have
answered this question affirmatively in Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co.,22 where
an action brought in a federal district court by an employer requesting both
to enjoin the breach of a no-strike collective-bargaining agreement and dam-
ages was considered. Having decided in a companion case that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act required dismissal of the count requesting injunctive relief, 23
the Supreme Court held that the district court had jurisdiction to proceed
to trial on the merits of the count requesting damages. 24 Thus, it is clear
that a district court has jurisdiction to hear a case involving the breach of a
no-strike collective-bargaining contract even though the prayer for relief
includes a request for injunctive relief.
The Avco case differs from the Atkinson case only in that Avco was
originally brought in a state court and "general relief" was requested instead
of damages. That damages were not specifically requested in Avco should
not prevent the district court from assuming jurisdiction. Rule 54(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "every final judgment shall
grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled,
even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." The prayer
for general relief in Avco would thus enable the district court to grant dam-
ages, if appropriate. Indeed, the rule seems to provide that a court will not
be prevented from assuming jurisdiction merely by the wording of the prayer
for relief. Accordingly, the prayer for "general relief" constituted no bar to
the Avco court's assumption of jurisdiction. If the corporation in Avco had
originally brought its action in the district court, that court, following the
Atkinson precedent, would have been able to take original jurisdiction of the
action. Since the test for removal of an action is whether the action could
have been originally brought in the district court, it follows that removal
was properly allowed in Avco.
The state court in Avco issued a temporary injunction against the union.
The propriety, however, of such state court injunctions in section 301 actions
is not settled. Most states have held that the prohibitions of Section 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act do not extend to state courts. 25 However, the Avco
18 29 U.S.C. 	 104 (1965).
19 29 U.S.C. 	 185(a) (1965).
29 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 203, 210 (1962).
21 Id.
22 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
23 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 US. at 210, 215.
24 370 U.S. at 239-41.
25 See, e.g, Armco Steel Corp. v. Perkins, 411 S.W.2d 935 (Ky. 1967); McCarroll
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court stated that the remedies available in section 301 actions in state courts
should be limited to those available in federal courts. The court reasoned
that since injunctions against peaceful strikes are not available in federal
courts, they should likewise not be available in state courts. Otherwise, a
uniform development of the law of labor contracts would be impaired. Such
a rule would seem to be consistent with the Supreme Court's decisions con-
struing section 301. The Court has held that section 301 commissions a
federal contract law which is to be formed "from the policy of our national
labor laws."28 Moreover, in Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson," the Court
affirmed the importance of section 4 to the national labor policy by referring
to section 4 as "a long-standing, carefully thought out and highly significant
part of this country's labor legislation." 28 As section 4 represents a strong
federal policy that peaceful strikes should not be enjoined, logic would seem
to require that this policy should be incorporated into the federal contract
law. State law providing for injunctions against breaches of no-strike
collective-bargaining contracts would be inconsistent with this federal policy.
Since the federal contract law prevails over inconsistent state laws," it
follows that in section 301 actions state courts should be prohibited from
granting injunctions against violation of a no-strike contract. However, until
the Supreme Court resolves this question, it can be assumed that state courts
will continue to grant injunctions in actions involving no-strike contracts.
The holding in Avco, then, considered in the light of Supreme Court
decisions, seems to constitute correct law. The result of the case, however, is
disturbing. A strict application in Avco of the prohibitions of Section 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act does not seem to implement the purposes of that
Act. Moreover, denial of injunctive relief seems to contravene a legislative
purpose behind the Taft-Hartley Act—"restoring equality of bargaining
power between employers and employees""—by removing an effective rem-
edy previously available to employers for enforcement of collective-
bargaining contracts. It is submitted that the history of the two acts indicates
that they could be accommodated to effectuate the congressional policies
behind their enactment.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was enacted in 1932 partly as a reaction
to widespread injustices brought about by the excessive use of injunctions
against labor in federal courts." Its objective was to assure "that the govern-
ment shall occupy a neutral position, lending its extraordinary power neither
to those who would have labor unorganized nor to those who would organize
v. District Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d' 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 932 (1958).
26 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456.
27 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
28 Id. at 203.
29 Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. at 102.
30 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1965).
31 "That there have been abuses of judicial power in granting injunctions in labor
disputes is hardly open to discussion. The use of the injunction in such disputes has been
growing by leaps and bounds." Comment, Quid Pro Quo in Federal Labor Law: Enforce-
ment of the No-Strike Clause, 1963 Wis. L. Rev. 626, 631 n.29, citing S. Rep. No. 163,
72d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1932).
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it."32
 It was hoped that by prohibiting federal courts from enjoining peaceful
strikes, the Act would prevent employers from gaining an unfair advantage
in labor disputes.33 Thus protected by the Norris-LaGuardia Act and subse-
quent labor legislation, organized labor grew substantially" and improved
its bargaining position with respect to management. However, in 1947, as the
result of both an increasing frequency of labor disputes 35
 and the common
law rule in many states that labor unions were not legal entities," Congress
enacted Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act. One stated purpose of the Act
was "to equalize legal responsibilities of labor organizations and employers." 37
Congress' statutory recognition of the collective-bargaining agreement as an
enforceable contract was intended to promote greater responsibility between
employers and unions and thereby to promote industrial peace 3 8 The Su-
preme Court interpreted section 301 as expressing a federal policy that
collective-bargaining agreements should be enforced "on behalf of or against
labor organizations and that industrial peace can be best obtained only in
that way."
The Court further stated that the legislative history of section 301
indicates that the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro
quo of a no-strike agreement. 4° Since collective-bargaining agreements should
be enforced on behalf of or against labor unions, it would seem that the
agreement to arbitrate and the no-strike agreement should each be enforced
equally by the federal courts. However, this has not been the case. Although
the employer's promise to arbitrate is specifically enforceable, 41 the Supreme
Court has held that Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act prevents specific
enforcement in federal courts of the union's no-strike promise. 42
It is submitted that the prohibitions of Section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act should not be applicable in the case of an express no-strike
agreement. Breaches of no-strike contracts were probably not a major
incentive in 1932 to passage of the Act, as there were at that time few labor
agreements to breach 93 Instead, the legislative history of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act indicates that the act was designed to allow unions to bargain
without hindrance from federal courts." But there is a vast difference be-
tween protecting unions from judicial interference that might hinder their
bargaining power and permitting unions effectively to breach their agree-
32 75 Cong. Rec. 4915 (1932) (remarks of Senator Wagner).
" Witte, The Federal Anti-Injunction Act, 16 Minn. L. Rev. 638, 657 (1932).
34 See Comment, supra note 31, at 631.
85 93 Cong. Rec. 3534 (1947) (remarks of Representative Hardy).
36 See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders Union 125, 150 F. 155 (ED. Wis.
1906); see also Cleland v. Anderson, 66 Neb. 252, 92 N.W. 306 (1902).
37 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
38 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 453 n.4.
377 Id. at 455.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 451.
42 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 203.
43 See Stewart, No-Strike Clauses in the Federal Courts, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 673, 678
(1962).
44 Id. at 677-78.
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ments once reached." That damages are an available remedy for breaches
of the no-strike contract" should not diminish an employer's right to effec-
tive enforcement of the no-strike promise. Moreover, the remedy of damages
does not adequately compensate an employer for the incalculable harm
caused by the loss of goodwill to his enterprise.'" Additionally, the knowl-
edge of this loss of good-will may motivate an employer to make concessions
to the union to end the strike; concessions which need not be made if an
injunction were available."
Seemingly, then, the federal contract law should provide injunctive
relief for the breach of a no-strike collective-bargaining agreement. To ac-
complish this result, commentators have urged either: (1) the Supreme
Court accommodate section 301 and section 4 so as to allow injunctions
in federal courts," or (2) Congress amend Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act to permit federal courts to enjoin strikes in violation of the duty to
arbitrate. 5°
It must be recognized, however, that neither of these solutions is
likely to occur soon. In 1962, the Supreme Court in Sinclair specifically re-
jected the view that cases construing section 301 undermine the anti-
injunction provisions of Norris-LaGuardia."' Although the Court spoke of
the beneficial results to employers of allowing an injunction to bar breach of
their collective-bargaining agreements, the Court stated that the legislative
history of section 301 clearly indicated that Congress intended that the
prohibitions of section 4 remain applicable." 2 The Court concluded that if
any change in the law was to take place, Congress must initiate it. 53 Like-
wise, it seems improbable that Congress will amend Section 4 of the Act—
five years have now passed since Sinclair without amendment. It can be
hoped, however, since Avco now effectively denies all injunctive relief, that
either the Supreme Court or Congress will deem it necessary to reconsider
the problem.
JOSEPH F. SULLIVAN, JR.
45 Id. at 678.
4° See Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
41 See Comment, supra note 31, at 634.
49 Id.
49 See, e.g., Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reappraised, 10 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 292, 345
(1963); Rice, A Paradox of Our National Labor Law, 34 Marg. L. Rev. 233, 253-54
(1951).
5° See, e.g., Aaron, supra note 49, at 345.
51 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 213-15.
52 Id. at 205-08, 214.
53 Id. at 215.
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